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1. SUBSIDIARITY: CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL AMBIVALENCE 
 
When in the second half of the 1980s debates regarding further European integration 
commenced, and an agreement on the division of different community, national and regional 
competences had to be elaborated, the principle of subsidiarity became the center of attention. 
It was not a new concept. Already in Aristotle’s Politeia, and later by influential authors like 
de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill, the principle was referred to. The principle of 
subsidiarity would also take central stage as a key concept in the Christian democratic sociale 
doctrine in the 1930s. Included in the papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno of 1931, 
subsidiarity was meant to defend the individual against rising totalitarianism. All approaches 
concerning subsidiarity have in common an emphasis on the limited role of the state. The 
state should intervene as little as possible in the performance of duties of smaller communities 
and individuals. A society consists of different spheres that are to a certain extent sovereign, 
and this sovereignty needs to be respected. Subsidiarity, as defined in the European Union 
(EU), defines the essence of the community’s intervention: national action is the rule, 
community action the exception. Subsidiarity as a managing principle in the EU has two 
dimensions: first, the Community has to refrain from intervention when member states can 
more efficiently or appropriately achieve objectives, and second, it must act effectively when 
necessary (i.e. when goals can be achieved through European intervention). Hence, the 
Community institutions (and most notably the European Commission) are bound by both 
abstention and intervention (Pauwels, 1995: 432-435). This essence can be transposed to other 
policy levels and policy domains in the increasingly complex multilevel governance of policy 
issues.  
 
Notwithstanding that the principle appears straightforward at first sight, several reservations 
should be made however. First, different authors argue that the concept is not only complex, 
but ambivalent (van Kersbergen and Verbeek, 2007: 224-225) and fluid (de Búrca, 2000: 11) 
as well, and that, depending on the policy issue, context or relationship between policy levels, 
applied differently (Carozza, 2003: 39):  
 
The problem, one might conclude, is that such a principle is too imprecise and soft, 
and therefore entirely open to disagreement – a reification of politics as indeterminate 
as the discourse of human rights itself. In that case, subsidiarity would not contribute 
anything other than a new vocabulary, a new rhetorical structure, within which to 
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contest the same values and principles that it was meant to address. The only sure way 
to address that challenge is to put subsidiarity to the test by seeking to apply it to 
concrete, "real world" problems. [...] we must remember that subsidiarity is a general 
principle, not a clear rule. Even within the existing uses of subsidiarity in the law and 
politics of the European Union the principle is clearly not a "hard" enough concept to 
resolve by itself the complex and multifaceted issues of unity and pluralism that 
underlie it (Carrozza, 2003: 78-79). 
 
Second, the conceptual ambiguity is transferred into practice. On the one hand, the member 
states have an argument at their disposal to counter unwanted community interference. On the 
other hand, the principle of subsidiarity makes decision-making practice more complicated. 
Moreover, it is possible that member states abuse the subsidiarity principle to thwart 
community action that is necessary for certain reasons. In a similar vein, the community 
institutions may misuse the principle. Whereas some fear that subsidiarity is used to stretch 
community competences, the community may, in turn, hide behind the principle not to take 
action (Pauwels, 1995: 435-436). 
 
 
2. SUBSIDIARITY AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: CONTEMPORARY 
DEVELOPMENTS AND DEBATES 
 
Notwithstanding these reservations, the principle of subsidiarity remains fundamental to the 
EU’s operation. Furthermore, the principle is particularly relevant for the relationship between 
the EU, Belgium and the Belgian regions on the one hand, and for the organization of multi-
level governance among states and multilateral organizations on the other. 
 
First, on the level of the EU and the European member states, the central position of 
subsidiarity has been acknowledged once more in the context of the European Convention 
preparing a European Constitution. The working group on subsidiarity advanced some 
changes as regards the operationalization of the principle. In spite of the constitution’s failure, 
the plans with regard to subsidiarity have been largely maintained in the Treaty of Lisbon and 
its protocol on subsidiarity. The so-called subsidiarity test is worth mentioning in this regard: 
in case the member states feel that European legislative action is incompatible with the 
subsidiarity principle, they can put forward an appeal (van Kersbergen & Verbeek, 2007: 228-
231). Another complex issue in which subsidiarity plays a role concerns the action of the 
Union or the member states in policy domains where different competences meet (e.g. trade 
or competition vs. culture).  
 
Second, the Belgian context provides for extra arguments to deeply reflect on subsidiarity. 
Since the constitutional reform of 1993, the Belgian federated entities are able to engage in 
foreign relations regarding policy domains for which they are internally (i.e. in the Belgian 
federal structure) competent (the principle in foro interno, in foro externo). How the relations 
between the regions, the federal government and the EU are organized accordingly – e.g. how 
would a subsidiarity test proceed in case of regional competences – is not always that clear 
however (Beyers & Bursens, 2006: 71-72). 
 
Third, increasingly an academic debate is held with regard to subsidiarity on a global level. 
Often reference is made to the relation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) – a strong 
multilateral institution with a relatively effective dispute settlement system – with other 
multilateral organizations (e.g. the International Labour Organization; the World Intellectual 
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Property Organization; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) 
and states. Whereas some authors put forward a constitutionalization discourse that assigns a 
central role to the WTO in global governance (Petersmann, 2005; Jackson, 2001), others 
argue for more balanced global relations on the basis of the principle of global subsidiarity 
(Howse & Nicolaïdis, 2003). 
 
Next to conceptual ambivalence, the questions therefore rise whether subsidiarity, which is 
essentially a political principle, is effectively applied, and what the experiences with 
subsidiarity are in different policy issues and research domains. Specific questions that come 
to the fore are: whether the pendulum has swung into the direction of more regional 
autonomy, possibly undermining a more effective achievement of policy objectives on the 
European and global level; whether local, regional, national, European, and transnational 
policy levels gradually find an effective modus operandi; in which domains is this the case, in 
which domains not; how is subsidiarity conceived in cases where different competence 
regimes meet; does the extension of Flanders’ foreign policy autonomy encounter certain 
borders, and, if so, which ones; what are the costs and benefits of this competence extension 
for Flanders; as global subsidiarity is inspired by the European principle of subsidiarity, can 
we simply transpose the concept to a truly global multilevel governance context; when is the 
most adequate policy level the local, regional, national, European, or global level, and is this a 
matter of efficiency or politics? 
 
 
3. RELEVANCE FOR FLEMISH FOREIGN POLICY 
 
To answer these questions, the Flemish Research Centre on International Policy (Steunpunt 
Buitenlands Beleid, hereafter: Steunpunt) – the policy advisory research centre on Flemish 
foreign policy for the period 2007-2011 – organized a contactforum on ‘Subsidiarity and 
multi-level governance’ in Brussels on 12 October 2011. The Steunpunt collaborators and 
promoters considered it indeed interesting to conclude the centre’s activities with a day of 
reflection about subsidiarity and multi-level governance and the relevance of these concepts 
for the role of a subnational actor in foreign policy. Issues of subsidiarity had been 
omnipresent in the research within the four thematic pillars of the Steunpunt: European and 
global affairs; cultural diversity and subsidiarity; economic globalization; and development 
cooperation and human rights. On the one hand, subsidiarity (governing as close to the people 
as effectively possible) can be conceived as the rationale for a Flemish foreign policy. On the 
other, within every foreign policy domain of Flanders (e.g. international cultural policy, trade 
policy, development cooperation), the region is confronted with questions of (effectively, 
efficiently and legitimately) allocating and variously dealing with policy responsibilities and 
competencies at and between multinational, European, national and subnational levels. 
 
It is an interesting observation to make in this introduction that the role of the Flemish 
government (through successive Belgian state reforms) and the content of foreign policy 
everywhere have changed more or less simultaneously, starting in the latter half of the 1970s. 
While the Belgian state evolved into a federal state and the Flemish (as well as the other 
regions’) government developed and acquired ever more competencies, the substance of 
foreign policy grew everywhere increasingly away from classic, hard diplomatic and security 
issues, towards softer dimensions as economic integration, environmental cooperation and 
cultural collaboration. Thus, it became somehow logical, if not necessary, that with the 
Belgian state reform of 1993 (the St Michael’s agreement / Sint-Michielsakkoord), the 
constitutional reformers decided to allocate to the subnational governments the responsibility 
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to execute external policies in those domains for which they are internally competent, known 
as the in foro interno, in foro externo principle. Again interestingly coinciding; in the same 
year the European Maastricht Treaty provided for the possibility of subnational delegations in 
the Council of Ministers and introduced the concept of subsidiarity in the constitutional 
system of the European Union.  
 
This simultaneous evolution of more competencies for subnational governments (in casu: 
Flanders) and external (European and multilateral) dimensions to these competencies due to 
enhanced interdependence pose many questions and challenges for Flemish foreign policy. 
The Flemish Government had to develop an apparatus to manage its responsibility for 
external aspects of its internal competencies (internal organization). It had to learn how to 
cooperate with other policy levels (other federated entities, the Belgian federal level, the EU 
level and so on; external organization). It had to think about and formulate own international 
policy positions in its different competency domains (developing and defending positions). In 
short, it had, regarding both content and form, to search for its role in the multi-level 
governance of European and world politics. 
 
 
4. ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK 
 
The proceedings of the contactforum that are bundled in this book offer a very broad, yet 
coherent and insightful discussion of the problems and promises of the concepts of multi-level 
governance and subsidiarity with regard to international politics. A first series of chapters 
historically and/or conceptually discuss the concept of subsidiarity (and multi-level 
governance) and its actual relevance. A second series of chapters is of an empirical nature and 
discusses the history of Flemish foreign policy; the judicial application of subsidiarity by and 
within Flanders with regard to external policy aspects; and the application of subsidiarity in 
particular policy domains. Both the Steunpunt resarchers and other external colleagues in the 
field were asked to zoom in on questions, problems and promises of subsidiarity as they have 
encountered them in their research. 
 
In the first chapter, Hugo Durieux analyses the current debates around the principles of 
subsidiarity and multi-level governance as a way to capture and cope with complexity. He 
points out that these concepts have some similarities with the classic anarchist theories about 
the construction of federated societies and decision-models. This allows Durieux to draw 
attention to similarities and differences between the two schools, and to related criticisms and 
pitfalls that both anarchism and multi-level governance may encounter (cf. Hardt and Negri’s 
discussion of imperial control). To give just one example, Durieux aptly observes that 
contemporary governments as Italy’s second Berlusconi-government (2001-2005) and 
Cameron’s Conservative-Lib-Dem Government have decentralized and further privatized 
responsibilities (e.g. on education, health, local policing), while at the same time cutting 
budgets. This kind of subsidiarity would clearly not enhance basic democracy. Durieux offers 
many more new intriguing questions than answers. But this will allow the reader to approach 
the other contributions with a much wider perspective, and as she or he will notice much of 
the questions raised by Durieux reappear in more concrete shapes elsewhere.  
 
In the next chapter, Emiel Lamberts explores and explains the history of the principle of 
subsidiarity in the European Union. The author especially focuses on the social-Catholic roots 
of the subsidiarity principle, bringing together a proscriptive as well as a prescriptive 
interpretation and a socio-functional as well as (to a lesser degree) a political-territorial 
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application. Lamberts then goes on to show how this vision of subsidiarity became embedded 
in the European integration process, to a large extent through important European figures with 
a Christian democratic background (e.g. Schuman, De Gasperi, Adenauer, Delors). Lamberts 
concludes that with the Lisbon Treaty, the principle of subsidiarity has been laid down as a 
fundamental rule of European integration, albeit from a social-Catholic viewpoint in a 
reduced and leaner form: with a dominating political-territorial and proscriptive application.  
 
While Durieux discusses in a philosophical way the similarities and differences between 
subsidiarity and multi-level governance and anarchism, and the problems they are both 
contemporary confronted with and Lamberts has analysed the social-Catholic historical roots 
of the contemporary application of the subsidiarity principle in the European Union, Kees van 
Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek complete the first, theoretically oriented part of the book. 
They discuss how the subsidiarity principle, as actually implemented in the EU since the 
Maastricht Treaty, has contributed to new conflicts in the Union. Their analysis puts forward 
three claims: first, subsidiarity is a compromise between various ideologies serving to 
circumvent agreement on a fixed and clear division of competencies in the EU; second, the 
application of the principle has produced a political struggle over actual policies which until 
present seems to have mainly benefitted the member states. Third, the concept of multi-level 
governance entails many different interpretations; if defined as existence of interdependence 
between players (public/private, different levels), it may work to the advantage of specific 
subnational veto players. Van Kersbergen and Verbeek conclude that the adoption of 
subsidiarity has not brought a clear demarcation of competencies, but has ushered in a battle 
among old and new players. They thereby very rightly stress that the interpretation of 
subsidiarity is a very political exercise and act, notwithstanding the rather technical, 
consensual and almost a-political connotation of the concept – as is the case with its nephew 
multi-level governance. The division of competences between different levels makes certain 
policies (e.g. redistribution) more or less possible or expedient. Therefore, multi-level 
governance is inherently power-relevant (see Devos, 2001; Scharpf, 2006).  
 
These three texts have laid out a general spectrum of perspectives to incorporate in the more 
concrete analyses of the international role of Flanders, and of the practice of multi-level 
governance in the domains that the Steunpunt has covered. Steunpunt senior researcher David 
Criekemans links the theory and Flemish practice of subsidiarity in external relations to three 
approaches in relevant literature on sub-state diplomacy and foreign policy. As the author has 
expertise with Flemish foreign policy almost since its origin, which is demonstrated by 
several examples in this chapter, he claims that over time, Flemish sub-state diplomacy, in its 
relation to other policy levels and players, has been evolving from a state of discordance, over 
duplication to complementarity. 
 
Werner Vandenbruwaene in his discussion of the judicial application and enforcement of 
subsidiarity takes up with the complexity and political and contested character of the principle 
as established by the former authors. Vandenbruwaene finds that enforcement of subsidiarity 
remains difficult, but that procedures as impact assessment and the ‘early warning system’ 
may be worthwhile, although they simultaneously need further elaboration. With regard to the 
Belgian context, implementation of the Protocol on subsidiarity should be re-evaluated with 
regard to a more cooperative approach. He ends with the conclusion that more profound 
scrutiny of subidiarity can only enhance legitimacy in a multilayered polity as the EU or 
Belgium.1  
                                                           
1 As this contribution is a legal analysis, the reference system is different from the other, social sciences, 
contributions. 
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Next, Evert Waeterloos and Robrecht Renard discuss the interesting domain of 
development cooperation. As is also the case in many other domains, different principles and 
objectives pull development cooperation in different directions, not always with positive 
results. The international community realized that effectiveness of aid had to be strengthened, 
namely through donor cooperation and a rational division of labour between donors. 
However, in the same period, a wide range of new aid actors have stood up and the 
involvement of subnational European governments has expanded in the name of subsidiarity. 
With regard to the Belgian context, Waeterloos and Renard find that, notwithstanding a 
learning process has taken place, reconciling the tension between rationalization and 
subsidiarity within the ‘European Division of Labour’ requires a fuller enactment of the 
subsidiarity principle at the intermediate level of the Belgian nation.  
 
The next two chapters deal with subsidiarity and EU cultural policies. Jan Loisen focuses on 
the tension between EU trade policy, a supranational competence, and cultural policies for 
which the member states are competent. He discusses the concept of global subsidiarity as a 
potential complement to the narrower subsidiarity perspective that is often adopted by 
observers and practitioners in the EU in thinking about reconciling economic and cultural 
objectives on a supranational scale. Global subsidiarity (a concept developed together with 
Robert Howse by Kalypso Nicolaïdis, one of the speakers at the contactforum) has three 
essential features: institutional sensitivity, political inclusion and top-down empowerment. 
The author concludes that these principles offer a promising way forward in reconciling 
economic and cultural values in global cultural policy, and finds that while the EU seems to 
be embarking on this way, it still has a way to go to do them full justice.  
 
Karen Donders discusses the application of subsidiarity in the interrelationship between EU 
State aid policy and public service broadcasting. In the EU, most member states and public 
broadcasters maintain that the member states are exclusively competent for media policy and 
public broadcasting in particular (and have the subsidiarity principle on their side), while the 
Commission feels that it is competent to some extent on the basis of its exclusive competition 
responsibility. The author concludes that debates on subsidiarity have clouded the more 
substantial debates on the future of public service broadcasting, and that member states and 
the Commission have been more concerned with power divisions than the actual subject of 
their actions. This observation echoes similar remarks made by Durieux and van Kersbergen 
and Verbeek.  
 
Ferdi De Ville in his chapter on subsidiarity and Flemish and EU trade policy argues that 
subsidiarity is the central problem of contemporary trade governance. The trade-off between 
(economic) efficiency and (democratic) legitimacy embodied in value conflicts is key to 
discussions about the future of the WTO. The author notes the striking present structure under 
which democracies carry the burden of proof when enacting trade restrictive regulation. With 
the Treaty of Lisbon, in the same name of efficiency and legitimacy, trade policy has (finally) 
become an exclusive EU competency, implying that (sub)national Parliaments no longer have 
to ratify trade agreements, while the European Parliament assumes this role. De Ville argues 
that (sub)national parliaments should seize the room this provides them to start a debate about 
the social purpose of trade policy, i.e. the balance between free trade and other social 
objectives democratic societies pursue.  
 
Finally, Dirk De Bièvre and Lars Thomann argue that, whereas subsidiarity is often 
understood as the allocation of decision-making authority to a particular higher or lower level 
of governance, the allocation of decision-making power can also travel between different 
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governance arrangements. These are often formally at the same level, yet distinct and with 
differing enforceability, introducing a de facto hierarchy of norms. The authors argue that 
diverging actor preferences and differing degrees of judicialization account for actors’ forum 
choice. Conceiving of judicialization as the delegation of adjudication to an independent third 
party and the enforcement through multilaterally authorized sanctions, they show that actors 
preferring weak regulatory intellectual property rights standards – mostly intellectual property 
importing countries – strive to pursue interests in forums with low degrees of judicialization, 
whereas intellectual property exporting countries prefer highly judicialized forums. In their 
chapter, they demonstrate how these expectations hold in the field of the regulation of plant 
genetic resources and intellectual property rights for medicines. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Beyers, J. & Bursens, P. (2006). Europa is geen buitenland. Over de relatie tussen het 
federale België en de Europese Unie. Leuven: Acco. 
Carozza, P. G. (2003). Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights 
Law. The American Journal of International Law, 97(1), 38-79. 
de Búrca, G. (2000). Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam (Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 7/99). Cambridge: Harvard Law School. Available online at 
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/99/990701.html (Retrieved 30 September, 
2011). 
Devos, C. (2001). Machtsrelevantie van Multi-level Structuren: Een Algemene Verkenning. 
Res Publica, 43(1), 81-101.  
Jackson, J. H. (2001). ‘The WTO 'Constitution' and Proposed Reforms: Seven 'Mantras' 
Revisited. Journal of International Economic Law, 4(1), 67-78. 
Howse, R. and Nicolaïdis, K. (2003). Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or 
Global Subsidiarity? Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, 
and Institutions, 16(1), 73-94. 
Pauwels, C. (1995). Culture and economy: the fields of tensions in the Community’s 
audiovisual policy. An analysis of the limits and possibilities of a qualitative cultural 
and communications policy in an economically integrated Europe. Unpublished PhD 
thesis (in Dutch), Free University of Brussels. 
Petersmann, E.-U. (2005). Addressing Institutional Challenges to the WTO in the New 
Millennium: A Longer-Term Perspective. Journal of International Economic Law, 8(3), 
647-665. 
Scharpf, F. W. (2006). The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 44(4), 845-864. 
van Kersbergen, K. and Verbeek, B. (2007). The Politics of International Norms: Subsidiarity 
and the Imperfect Competence Regime of the European Union. European Journal of 
International Relations, 13(2), 217-238.
 
